We investigate newsvendor games whose payoff function is uncertain due to ambiguity in demand distributions. We discuss the concept of stability under uncertainty and introduce solution concepts for robust cooperative games which could be applied to these newsvendor games. Properties and numerical schemes for finding core solutions of robust newsvendor games are presented.
Introduction
A joint venture is usually an effective approach for individual players in the market to share costs, reduce risk, and increase the total joint revenue or profit. For example, individual retailers can decide whether to order inventories together and share the profit from selling ordered products later. As a part of the joint venture formation, all players should agree on how to share the joint profit or payoff before the cooperation is established. Cooperative game theory provides a mathematical framework for addressing this problem, which is modeled as newsvendor centralization games (or newsvendor games for short). The model of these games has been introduced in Hartman [16] . Formally, consider the set N of N retailers and letd i ∈ R + be the random demand for retailer i, i ∈ N . In the setting of newsvendor games, we assume that the unit ordering cost c and the unit selling price p are the same for all retailers, 0 < c < p. Given an ordering quantity y, the expected profit (or payoff) of retailer i is v i (y) = E P i p min{d i , y} − cy , i ∈ N .
Individual retailer i needs to decide the optimal ordering quantity y * i to maximize the expected profit (or payoff), y * i ∈ arg max y≥0 v i (y), which is the (p − c)/p-quantile of P i , the distribution function ofd i for all i ∈ N . The optimal expected profit isv i = v i (y * i ) = E P i p min{d i , y * i } − cy * i . In the newsvendor games, we are concerned about whether individual retailers should form a coalition to make orders together and share the inventories with each other. For a coalition S ⊆ N , the aggregate demand isd(S) = i∈Sd i and we assume that the joint distribution P (S) ofd i , i ∈ S, is known. Given an ordering quantity y, the total expected profit of coalition S is v(y, S) = E P (S) p min{d(S), y} − cy .
Similarly, coalition S of retailers needs to decide the optimal ordering quantity y * (S) to maximize the total expected profit,
which again is the (p − c)/p-quantile of the distribution ofd(S). The optimal total expected profit of coalition S isv (S) = v(y * (S), S) = E P (S) p min{d(S), y * (S)} − cy * (S) .
In order to guarantee that all retailers are satisfied with the grand coalition N , there should be an allocation (also called payoff distribution) of the total expected profitv(N ) among retailers such that no group of retailers has the incentive to form a smaller but better coalition. Newsvendor games concern about the existence of these stable payoff distributions.
Traditionally, the underlying assumption in newsvendor games is that the joint demand distribution is known with certainty. Under this assumption, the expected profitsv(S) are known for all S ⊆ N . In reality, it can be sometimes difficult to justify this assumption, especially when retailers need to decide whether to cooperate with each other before observing and sharing records of joint demands. If the joint demand distribution is unknown, the expected profitsv(S) are uncertain. Under the assumption that these payoffs are random variables, several models of stochastic cooperative games have been studied in order to address the uncertainty in coalition payoffs . Charnes and Granot [7] propose a two-stage payoff distribution scheme. In the first stage, some amounts of individual payoffs, which are called prior-payoffs, are promised to the players in the coalition. In the second stage, once the coalition payoff is realized, there could be adjustments in individual payoffs to guarantee that the payoff distribution is feasible and that any objections among the players are minimized. This approach assumes risk-neutral behaviors among players. Suijs et al. [26] study a different payoff distribution scheme for stochastic cooperative games using preference orders for random payoffs, which can handle different types of risk
behavior. An individual payoff under this distribution scheme consists of two parts. The first part is a monetary exchange between players and the second part is a fraction of the random coalition payoff, which can depend on the action taken by the coalition. This distribution scheme works well for some applications such as the insurance game discussed in Suijs et al. [25] . More recently, Uhan [29] generalizes this payoff distribution scheme for stochastic linear programming games with applications in inventory centralization and network fortification. Timmer et al. [27] argue that risk-covering monetary compensation is not needed in other applications. It is indeed a reasonable assumption that players (e.g., retailers or firms) in the examples discussed therein do not feel the need to pay upfront in order to benefit from a greater share of the profit in the future. Timmer et al. [27] then propose a similar payoff distribution scheme for stochastic cooperative games without monetary exchange in which a multiple of the random coalition payoff is allocated to each individual. Fernández et al. [14] also consider this payoff distribution scheme as a special case while investigating general stochastic payoff distributions using stochastic orders for stochastic cooperative games.
In addition to these models of stochastic cooperative games, there are different models that address different aspects of cooperative games under uncertainty. Lehrer [19] investigates payoff distribution processes in repeated deterministic cooperative games. The payoff allocation at any time depends on past allocations and current coalition payoffs. Lehrer [19] shows that these payoff distribution processes converge to some well-known solutions of cooperative games under appropriate allocation rules. Dror et al. [10] extend these allocation rules and payoff distribution processes for repeated stochastic cooperative games and apply them to dynamic newsvendor realization games. Bauso and Timmer [1] , on the other hand, study dynamic cooperative games under the setting of a family of games whose coalition values are uncertain. Toriello and Uhan [28] investigate the dynamic linear programming games with riskaverse players. The study of cooperative games with incomplete information addresses other aspects of uncertainty in cooperative games. Ieong and Shoham [18] develop solution concepts of Bayesian cooperative games such as ex ante, ex interim, and ex post cores under the assumption that all players have a common prior over the set of possible states of the world but that each of them has some private information or belief about the true state of the world. More recently, Li and Conitzer [20] focus on solution concepts that maximize the probability of ex post stability assuming all players know the distribution of the random state of the world. Clearly, in this setting, private information of players does not play an important role since only ex post stability is considered. Chalkiadadis and Boutilier [6] study Bayesian coalition formation problems when players have different beliefs about contributions of other players to coalition payoffs, which makes coalition payoffs uncertain. Forges and Serrano [15] discuss different models of cooperative games with incomplete information that handle externality; i.e., the effects of actions and information of players outside a coalition on the coalition payoff and payoffs of individual players in the coalition.
In this paper, we focus on newsvendor games with uncertain expected profits (or payoffs) under a similar setting to those of stochastic cooperative games discussed above; that is, uncertainty is captured and represented only in the payoff functions of the games. Our research, however, is different from existing models of stochastic cooperative games given the fact it is difficult to obtain probabilistic information on uncertain expected profitsv(S), S ⊆ N . This assumption is particularly useful for newsvendor games considered in this paper in which the uncertainty of the payoffs is modeled through an uncertainty set derived from the ambiguity of the joint demand distribution.
Contributions and paper outline
In this paper, we focus on the newsvendor games with ambiguity in the joint demand distribution.
Specifically, our contributions and the structure of the paper are as follows:
(1) Section 3 develops a framework of cooperative games with uncertain payoffs which could be applied to newsvendor games under distributional ambiguity. We call these games robust cooperative games. Solution concepts such as imputation, core, and game balancedness of robust cooperative games are defined and discussed.
(2) Section 4 studies newsvendor games with ambiguity in demand distributions using the framework of robust cooperative games. We focus on the existence of rational and stable payoff distributions of these robust newsvendor games. We also discuss the computational aspect of finding core solutions for robust newsvendor games and provide some numerical results.
Deterministic Cooperative Games
Before presenting the model of cooperative games with uncertain payoffs that could be applied for newsvendor games under distributional ambiguity, we introduce some solution concepts of deterministic cooperative games whose payoffs are known with certainty. Consider a set of N players, N = {1, . . . , N }, and a function v : 2 N → R, which is called the characteristic function, such that v(∅) = 0. We call G = (N , v) a cooperative game. Utility (payoff) is assumed to be transferable, i.e., for any coalition S ⊆ N , its total payoff is completely defined as v(S), which can be transferred freely among its members.
Under the assumption that the joint demand distribution is known with certainty, the newsvendor games previously introduced is indeed a deterministic cooperative game,Ḡ = (N ,v), wherev is defined as in (4).
Given a cooperative game (N , v), we are interested in finding an allocation x ∈ R N to distribute the total payoff v(N ) among individual players. An allocation (also called a payoff distribution) x is efficient if
An important question regarding cooperative games is whether players are willing to join the grand coalition N . Necessarily, there should be an allocation x ∈ R N with which each individual player is better off as compared to his/her standalone payoff. An allocation x is called individually rational if
Definition 1. An imputation is an allocation that is both efficient and individually rational. The set of imputations of a cooperative game (N , v) is written as follows:
If the characteristic function v is super-additive, i.e., for any two disjoint coalitions S 1 and S 2 ,
, it is clear that there always exists at least one imputation or
Individual rationality is not sufficient to guarantee that some players would prefer the grand coalition N to a smaller coalition S N . An allocation is called stable with respect to a coalition S if
Definition 2. The set of efficient allocations that are stable with respect to all coalitions S ⊆ N is called the core,
It is obvious that core(N , v) ⊆ impu(N , v). However, the core might not exist. There are different solution concepts that take this issue into account. Given a parameter ≥ 0, the -core is defined as follows:
It is clear that -core is non-empty for a given large enough . The least core is the non-empty -core with the smallest value of , which is called the least core value. The least core value (N , v) is the optimal value of the following linear program:
If we are able to solve Problem (10) and obtain (N , v) = 0, then the core is non-empty. Schulz and
Uhan [24] consider Problem (10) in a slightly different way:
In general, we have (N , v) = max{s(N , v), 0}, i.e., s(N , v) coincides with the least core value if it is non-negative. If s(N , v) < 0, the absolute value |s(N , v)| can be interpreted as the maximum possible increase in all coalition payoffs v(S), S N , under the condition that at least one efficient and stable allocation still exists.
For the newsvendor game (N ,v), the characteristic functionv is super-additive. Indeed, we havē
, where x + = max{x, 0}. Consider two disjoint coalitions S 1 and S 2 , S 1 ∩ S 2 = ∅; we haved(S 1 ∪ S 2 ) = d(S 1 ) +d(S 2 ). Using (3) and the fact that (x + y) + ≤ x + + y + , we havē
This shows that newsvendor games always have imputations. For normally distributed demands, Hartman et al. [17] show that the cores of these games are non-empty. Chen and Zhang [8] use stochastic linear programming duality to show the non-emptiness of the core in inventory centralization games and to provide a computational method for finding one. Müller et al. [22] prove that every newsvendor game has a non-empty core, i.e., for all possible distributions of random demands. Montrucchio and Scarsini [21] show how to construct an allocation in the core of newsvendor games. In the next section, we develop a model of cooperative games with uncertain characteristic functions that could be used to study newsvendor games with the ambiguity in demand distributions.
Robust Cooperative Games
When the payoffs are uncertain and assumed to be random variables (with finite expectation), the model of stochastic cooperative games proposed by Suijs et al. [26] can be applied. Suijs et al. [26] define a stochastic cooperative game as a tuple (N , A,ṽ, ), where N is the set of players, A(S) is the set of possible actions that coalition S, S ⊆ N , can take.ṽ(a, S) is the random payoff obtained by coalition S if action a ∈ A(S) is taken. The inclusion of action sets A(S) in this model of stochastic cooperative games reflects the fact that players can take different actions when facing uncertainty, which is different in the setting of deterministic cooperative games in which everything, including actions of players, is known with certainty. For newsvendor games, if retailers in a coalition S do not know their joint demand distribution, there is no ordering quantity to achieve the "optimal" expected profit and they can choose to pick an ordering quantity y from a set of possible ordering quantities Y(S). Clearly, the expected profit of a coalition S,ṽ(y, S), now depends on the ordering quantity y. Finally, i describes the preference of player i, i ∈ N , over different random variables. For two random payoffṽ andṽ ,ṽ iṽ means that player i prefersṽ overṽ . This order relation of stochastic payoffs is needed for this model of stochastic cooperative games to replace the straightforward comparison among deterministic payoffs in the deterministic setting. Suijs et al. [26] discuss several preference relations such as quantile-based relations and stochastic dominance for which the existence of core allocations is studied in detail.
For newsvendor games, the assumption of a known joint demand distribution in the deterministic setting can be considered to be rather strong given the fact that individual retailers usually collect historical demands independently before they join any coalition. In order to make the problem more realistic, we can assume that some (multivariate) marginal distributions are known instead of the joint distribution. For example, it is more reasonable to assume the knowledge of the joint demand distribution of a subset of retailers that are located close to each other and hence likely to serve customers from the same area. Under this assumption of distributional ambiguity, the joint demand distribution is unknown and belongs to an ambiguity set. For a coalition S, given an ordering quantity y, the total expected profitṽ(y, S) = EP (S) p min{d i , y} − cy(S) is uncertain and belongs to an uncertainty set if the (marginal) distributionP (S) is not known with certainty. In general, the characteristic functioñ v of newsvendor games is uncertain if there is ambiguity in demand distributions. In order to apply the model of stochastic cooperative games discussed above for these newsvendor games, we would need to assume that probability distributions of random payoffsṽ(y, S) are known. However, it is difficult to impose this probabilistic assumption, given that the randomness ofṽ(y, S) comes from the uncertainty of the probability distributionP (S). In order to address this issue, we propose a new model of general cooperative games with uncertain characteristic functions, which is different from the model of stochastic cooperative games proposed by Suijs et al. [26] .
Given a coalition S ⊆ N and an action a ∈ A(S), instead of consideringṽ(a, S) as a random variable, we consider it as an uncertain payoff v u (a, S), where u ∈ U and U is an uncertainty set. Let us denote V U (a, S) = {v u (a, S) : u ∈ U } for S ⊆ N and a ∈ A(S). We also denote V(U) = {v u :
A × 2 N → R, u ∈ U} as the set of all characteristic functions. This setting is appropriate for the newsvendor games with the ambiguity in demand distribution in which the joint demand distribution P belongs to an ambiguity set P. Given an allocation rule (or a payoff distribution scheme), each player i will obtain an uncertain allocation or payoff, denoted as x i (u), depending on the uncertain parameter u ∈ U. Instead of having a random payoffx i as in stochastic cooperative games, the uncertain payoff of player i is now represented by the set X i (U) = {x i (u) : u ∈ U} ⊂ R. For a coalition S, we obtain the set of payoff vectors X S (U) = {x S (u) : u ∈ U} ⊂ R |S| , where
To compare uncertain payoffs, we need to define a preference relation among sets of uncertain payoff vectors derived from the uncertainty set U and we write X S (U) Y S (U) if coalition S prefers the uncertain payoff vector x S (u) to y S (u). This preference relation will be needed to characterize when a smaller coalition prefers to break away from the grand coalition. Given a preference relation , we are ready to define a cooperative game with uncertain characteristic functions as a tuple (N , A, V(U), ).
As compared to the model of stochastic cooperative games discussed above, this model of cooperative games has uncertain characteristic functions characterized by the set V(U) instead of random variables.
Note that the preference relation is defined for coalitions using sets of payoff vectors, which is different from individual order relations between random variables as in stochastic cooperative games. We discuss solution concepts of cooperative games with uncertain characteristic functions next.
Solution Concepts
In order to discuss solution concepts of the new cooperative game (N , A, V(U), ), we first need to look at how payoffs can be allocated under uncertainty. When payoffs are assumed to be random variables, the most general payoff distribution scheme with random allocation for stochastic cooperative games is studied by Fernández et al. [14] . For a coalition S, they consider efficient allocations as random vectors
assuming a ∈ A(S) is the chosen action for the coalition. Suijs et al. [26] argue that this general stochastic payoff distribution scheme generates a very large class of allocations and results in computational difficulties. They propose a more restrictive payoff distribution scheme that can be represented by a
Note that this allocation scheme require probabilistic information, i.e., expectations of random characteristic functions. When the characteristic functions are deterministic, this allocation scheme coincides with the classical allocation of deterministic cooperative games, x i = d i for all i ∈ S, where
al. [27] propose another payoff distribution scheme that is represented by a vector z ∈ R S of multiples.
The stochastic allocation under this scheme isx i =ṽ(a, S) · z i for all i ∈ S. Here, it is not required for z i to be non-negative for i ∈ S. In order to guarantee that the stochastic allocation is efficient, it is required that i∈S z i = 1. Compared to the payoff distribution scheme in Suijs et al. [26] , Timmer et al. [27] argue that their proposed scheme does not allow monetary compensations to cover risk, which can be considered as a reasonable setting for several applications such as newsvendor games discussed above. Note that this scheme can also be seen as a direct extension of that of deterministic cooperative games since any allocation of deterministic cooperative games can be written in terms of multiples of v(S), assuming v(S) = 0. For the proposed model of cooperative games with uncertain characteristic functions, we face the same issues when defining payoff distribution schemes due to the uncertainty of the characteristic functions. Given that our main application is the newsvendor game in which riskcovering monetary compensation is not very important, we adopt a similar payoff distribution scheme to the one proposed by Timmer et al. [27] for our model of cooperative games with uncertain characteristic functions. Formally, for a coalition S, a payoff distribution scheme is represented by z ∈ R |S| such that for a given action a ∈ S, the uncertain allocation for each player i, i ∈ S is
A payoff distribution scheme z is efficient if i∈S z i = 1. This concept of efficiency indicates that the uncertain allocation x is efficient for all realizations of the uncertain characteristic function v u ∈ V(U). We are now ready to define solution concepts for cooperative games with uncertain characteristic functions using the proposed payoff distribution scheme.
Similar to stochastic cooperative games, the concepts of rationality and stability rely on both the payoff distribution scheme and the action taken by the grand coalition, the decision (a, z). The resulting
A player has the incentive to break away if he/she does not prefer the resulting uncertain allocation to his/her best standalone uncertain payoff, i.e., there exists α ∈ A({i}) such that
is individually rational if there is no individual player who has the incentive to break away. We now define the concept of stability. A sub-coalition S N has the incentive to break away if there exists an efficient decision (â,ẑ) for coalition S that does not lead to a worse uncertain payoff allocation, i.e., X S (U) X S (U). A decision (a, z) is stable if there is no sub-coalition S N that has the incentive to break away. In the next section, we investigate a particular preference relation and discuss imputations and core of the corresponding cooperative games, which we later call robust cooperative games.
Robust Cooperative Games
To discuss preference relations between sets of payoff vectors, we start with binary relations between payoff vectors. To characterize the preference of a coalition S between two payoff vectors, x S (u) and y S (u), given a realization u ∈ U, we adopt the common componentwise order , i.e.,
In other words, a coalition S prefers the payoff vector x S (u) than y S (u) if all of its member prefers their respective allocations. When S is a singleton, this binary relation is simply the inequality order on R. This componentwise order is often used in the field of multiobjective or vector optimization (see for example, Ehrgott [12] ). Under the uncertain setting, we need to compare sets of payoff vectors which share a common uncertain parameter. Bitran [4] studied uncertain multi-objective optimization under a similar setting and proposed the concept of necessary solutions.
Applying the same approach as in Bitran [4] , we can define the necessary preference relation n as follows.
Definition 5. Consider two sets of uncertain payoff vectors X S (U) and Y S (U) derived from an uncer-
This definition indicates that a coalition S necessarily prefers X S (U) over Y S (U) if no matter how u is realized, it always prefers x S (u) over y S (u). As defined previously, a stable coalition is a coalition whose sub-coalitions do not have incentives to break away, which means the resulting uncertain allocation from the coalition is preferred. The necessary preference relation n therefore generates a "necessary" stability, which follows the "immunized-against-uncertainty" principle of robust optimization (see Ben-Tal et al. [2] and references therein); therefore, we call cooperative games with uncertain characteristic functions and with preference relation n robust cooperative games.
We are now ready to characterize the existence of imputations and core decisions, i.e., decisions belong to the core, of robust cooperative games (N , A, V(U), n ). We start by making the following assumptions.
Assumption 1.
(i) For any player i ∈ N , there exists an action such that his/her payoff is always non-negative, i.e., there exists a ∈ A({i}) such that v u (a, {i}) ≥ 0 for all u ∈ U.
(ii) The payoff of the grand coalition N is always positive, i.e., v u (a, N ) > 0 for all a ∈ A(N ) and u ∈ U.
Similar to Timmer et al. [27] , these assumptions emphasize the fact that we are focusing on profit games with possible nonnegative payoff for each individual sub-coalition and it is indeed worth considering the grand coalition given that its profit is always positive. In other words, Assumption 1(ii)
implies that we should only consider the set of actions A(N ) which create positive profits under any circumstances for the grand coalition. For robust newsvendor games that we are going to discuss in Section 4, these assumptions are easily satisfied in general.
We now state the following result on existence conditions for imputations of robust cooperative games.
Theorem 1. Given a robust cooperative game (N , A, V(U), n ), an imputation exists if and only if there exists an action a ∈ A(N ) such that
where
In order to prove the theorem, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Given a robust cooperative game (N , A, V(U), n ) and a decision (a, z), a player i ∈ N has no incentive to break away if and only if z i ≥ v max (a, {i}).
Proof. We have: x i (u) = v u (a, N ) · z i for all i ∈ N and u ∈ U. Player i ∈ N does not have the incentive to break away if and only if
Under Assumption 1(ii), this holds if and only if z i ≥ max
We are now ready to prove the Theorem 1.
Proof. Suppose an imputation (a, z) exists. According to the definition of imputations, there is no player i ∈ N who has the incentive to break away. Thus, according to Lemma 1, we have:
Now, (a, z) is a decision of the grand coalition; therefore, i∈N z i = 1. Summing over all i ∈ N the above inequality, we then achieve condition (14) . Now, suppose condition (14) holds. Let = 1 − i∈N v max (a, {i}) ≥ 0 and define
We will show that (a, z) is an imputation. Clearly, z is efficient, i.e., i∈N z i = 1 given the definition of z i and . Now we have: for all u ∈ U,
Thus, under Assumption 1(ii),
It shows that for all u ∈ U,
Thus, there is no player i who has the incentive to break away; that is (a, z) is individually rational, which implies that (a, z) is an imputation.
Similar to the deterministic and stochastic cooperative games, the existence of core decisions is 
This definition of balanced robust cooperative games matches the definition of balanced deterministic games when |U| = |A(S)| = 1 for all S ⊆ N with the balancedness condition
We can now state the following theorem regarding the existence of core decisions. In order to prove Theorem 2, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Given a robust cooperative game (N , A, V(U), n ) and an imputation (a, z), a coalition S N has the incentive to break away if and only if
Proof. Given an imputation (a, z), a coalition S has the incentive to break away if there exists an efficient decision (â,ẑ) such that X S (U) nX S (U). It means there exists u ∈ U such that for all i ∈ S,
Since (â,ẑ) is efficient, we have:
Summing over all i ∈ S the inequality above, we then obtain the following statement:
Equivalently, under Assumption 1(ii), we have:
We have:
The second equality is due to the fact that v u (a, N ) > 0 for all u ∈ U under Assumption 1(ii). Thus, if a coalition S has the incentive to break away, then
Now, suppose i∈S z i < v max (a, S), we will show that coalition S has the incentive to break away. We would need to show the existence of an efficient decision (â,ẑ) such that X S (U) nX S (U), i.e., there exists u ∈ U such that for all i ∈ S,
. Clearly, we have:
From Lemma 1, we have z i ≥ v max (a, {i}) since (a, z) is an imputation. We also have, by Assumption 1(i), v max (a, {i}) ≥ 0. Thus, v max (a, S) > i∈S z i ≥ 0 and hence vû(â, S) = 0.
for all i ∈ S. Clearly,
given the definition of . In addition, for all i ∈ S, we have:
Thus, (â,ẑ) is an efficient decision and the inequality above shows that coalition S indeed has the incentive to break away.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 2.
Proof. Suppose there exists a core decision (a, z). Clearly, (a, z) is an imputation. Applying Lemma 2, we can show that z is a feasible (and optimal) solution of the following linear program:
The dual problem is written as follows:
S:i∈S
Applying strong duality, we have: Z D = Z P = 0, which means, for all feasible solution {y S } S N , p , 
Thus for all feasible solution {y S } S N , p , Theorem (2) establishes the relationship between the game balancedness and the existence of core solutions. Computationally, it implies that we can attempt to solve the following optimization problem to check the existence of core solutions:
If s(N , A, V(U), n ) ≤ 0, then the core of the robust cooperative game (N , A, V(U), n ) is non-empty.
Note that this optimization problem is no longer a linear program like Problem (10) or (11) given the fact that the action of the grand coalition is now a decision variable. We will investigate further the computational aspect of finding a core solution for a specific robust cooperative game, the robust newsvendor game, which is going to be discussed next. Even though the framework of robust cooperative games developed in this section is indeed suitable for the newsvendor games with distributional ambiguity which we are interested in, we would like to emphasize that it is plausible to develop other frameworks of cooperative games with uncertain characteristic functions using different payoff distribution schemes and different preference relations to suit other applications better.
Robust Newsvendor Games
In this section, we consider newsvendor games with ambiguity in demand distributions in the framework of robust cooperative games, which we call robust newsvendor games. As discussed in the previous section, the uncertainty comes from the fact that the joint demand distribution is unknown. We assume that only some (multivariate) marginal distributions of the joint demand are known. More concretely, consider a partition of N with R subsets N 1 , . . . , N R such that
N r and N r ∩ N s = ∅ for all r = s.
Given a vector d ∈ R n , let d r ∈ R Nr denote the sub-vector formed with the elements in the rth subset N r where N r = |N r | is the size of the subset. We assume that probability measures P r of random vectors d r are known for all r = 1, . . . , R. Let P(P 1 , . . . , P R ) denote the set of joint probability measures of the random vectord consistent with the prescribed probability measures of the random vectorsd r for all r = 1, . . . , R, which acts as the uncertainty set U in the general framework of robust cooperative games.
Note that P(P 1 , . . . , P R ) is always non-empty since the independent measure among the sub-vectors is a feasible distribution. The set of joint distributions with fixed marginal distributions P(P 1 , . . . , P R ) is referred to as the Fréchet class of distributions (see Rüschendorf [23] ). It has been used to evaluate bounds on the cumulative distribution function of a sum of random variables with an application in risk management (Embrechts and Puccetti [13] ). Doan and Natarajan [9] developed a robust optimization model using P(P 1 , . . . , P R ) with an application in project management. We now investigate this Fréchet class of distributions in the context of robust newsvendor games.
Given a subset S ⊆ N , we define S r = S ∩N r for all r = 1, . . . , R. Clearly, if all retailers i, i ∈ S, join together, we know the non-overlapping marginal distributions of the joint demand vector with respect to the partition (S 1 , . . . , S R ) of S. If S ⊆ N r for some r, the joint distribution ofd i , i ∈ S, is completely known. In this case, the action the coalition should take, i.e., the decision on the ordering quantity, is well-defined as in the deterministic setting. The action set of coalition S can be simply defined as Y(S) = {y * (S)}, where y * (S) is the (p − c)/p-quantile of the known distribution ofd(S) as defined in (3) . Note that Y(S) acts as the action set A(S) in the general framework of robust cooperative games. In general, the distribution P (S) is unknown and coalition S can choose its action regarding the ordering quantity from a general action set Y(S). To keep it simple, we shall let Y(S) = R + given the fact that the ordering quantities are non-negative for all S ⊆ N . As mentioned earlier, if S ⊆ N r for some r, we can restrict Y(S) = {y * (S)}, where y * (S) is the (p − c)/p-quantile of the known distribution ofd(S) as defined in (3).
Given an ordering decision y ∈ Y(S), the uncertain payoff, i.e., total expected profit, of coalition S is v P (y, S) = E P (S) p min{d(S), y} − cy for P ∈ P(P 1 , . . . , P R ) as in (2), where P (S) is the corresponding marginal joint distribution ofd i , i ∈ S, derived from P . For each individual retailer i, Y({i}) = y * i and v P (y * i , {i}) ≥ v P (0, {i}) = 0 for all P ∈ P(P 1 , . . . , P R ), which implies Assumption 1(i) is automatically satisfied.
Finally, for the grand coalition, in order to satisfy Assumption 1(ii), we let
We shall provide a simple condition with which the action set of the grand coalition is non-empty. Let d min (S) be the minimum value that the random demandd(S) can achieve, the following lemma sets out a sufficient condition for Y(N ) to be empty. 
For y ∈ [0, d min (N )], v P (y, N ) = (p − c)y, which is strictly increasing for any P ∈ P(P 1 , . . . , P R ) given the fact that p > c. In addition, for
, which is strictly decreasing for any P ∈ P(P 1 , . . . , P R ) given the fact that c > 0. Now consider the functionv(y, N ) = min Thus there exists y ≥ 0 such thatv(y, N ) > 0, or equivalently, v P (y, N ) > 0 for all P ∈ P(P 1 , . . . , P R ).
It shows that Y(N ) = ∅.
The condition in Lemma 3 simply requires that one of the (marginal) distributions P r , r = 1, . . . , R has the support set of solely non-zero demand vectors, which can be considered as a reasonable assumption in reality. In the rest of the paper, we shall make that assumption to ensure Y(N ) = ∅, or equivalently, that Assumption 1(ii) is satisfied. We are now ready to consider the robust newsvendor game (N , Y, V(P(P 1 , . . . , P r )), n ) and investigate the existence of its imputations and core solutions.
Existence of Imputations and Core Solutions
The uncertain characteristic function v P (y, S) can be written as
for all S ⊆ N , y ∈ Y(S), and P ∈ P(P 1 , . . . , P R ). The deterministic newsvendor games always have imputations since the corresponding characteristic function is super-additive. The following theorem claims the existence of imputations of the robust newsvendor game (N , Y, V(P(P 1 , . . . , P r )), n ).
Theorem 3. The robust newsvendor game (N , Y, V(P(P 1 , . . . , P r )), n ) always has an imputation.
In order to prove Theorem 3, we first study a particular action that each coalition can take, the worst-case optimal ordering quantity y * wc (S):
Basically, this ordering quantity is optimal under the worst-case scenario with respect to the joint demand distribution P . Let us also define v wc (S) as the maximum worst-case expected profit for coalition S, i.e.
When S ⊆ N r for some r, clearly, y * wc (S) = y * (S), the (p−c)/p-quantile of the known distribution of d(S), and v wc (S) =v(S) as defined in (4). The following lemma shows how to calculate the worst-case optimal ordering quantities y * wc (S) and the worst-case expected profit v wc (S) for an arbitrary S ⊆ N .
Lemma 4.
For an arbitrary S ⊆ N , the worst-case optimal ordering quantity y * wc (S) defined in (22) can be calculated as follows:
where S r = S ∩ N r for all r = 1, . . . , R, y * (S r ) is the (p − c)/p-quantile of the known distribution of (S r ).
Proof.
Consider the optimization problem in (22) . For y ≤ d min (S) = min{d(S)}, we can write (22) when calculating y * wc (S). Now, consider the inner optimization problem of (22) . This is an instance of the distributionally robust optimization problem studied in Doan and Natarajan [9] .
Without loss of generality, we can assume that S r = ∅ for all r = 1, . . . , R knowing that y * (∅) = 0.
Applying Proposition 1(ii) from [9] , we obtain the following reformulation:
Thus, in order to find y * wc (S), we can solve the following optimization problem
The optimal ordering quantity y * wc (S) can then be calculated as y *
x * r , where x * is the optimal solution of the following separable optimization problem:
For each sub-problem, x * r is the (p − c)/p-quantile of the distribution ofd(S r ), which means x * r = y * (S r ) for all r = 1, . . . , R, according to (3). Thus we have y * wc (S) = (S r ). Here, the joint demand distribution for players in S r is known and hence the worst-case expected profit v wc (S r ) is exactly the same with the deterministic expected profitv(S r )
shown in Formulation (4).
We are now ready to use this lemma to prove Theorem 3.
According to Theorem 1, the robust newsvendor game (N , Y, V(P(P 1 , . . . , P r )), n ) has imputations if and only if there exists y ∈ Y(N ) such that
where v max (y, {i}) = max
For each individual retailer i, the demand distribution is known; therefore Y({i}) = {y * i }, where y * i is the (p − c)/p-quantile of the distribution function ofd i . Thus
We then have v max (y, {i}) =v i · min
and the existence condition of imputation can be written as follows:
given the fact that v P (y, N ) > 0 for all y ∈ Y(N ) and P ∈ P(P 1 , . . . , P R ). Equivalently, the existence condition is
The optimization problem max y≥0 min P ∈P(P 1 ,...,P R ) v P (y, N ) is the same as Problem (22) . Let us consider the worst-case optimal ordering quantity y * wc (N ), the existence condition can then be written as follows:
Applying Lemma 4 for S = N , we have y *
we have, for all P ∈ P(P 1 , . . . , P R ),
wherev(N r ) is the optimal total expected profit of coalition N r and is computed using (4) for all r = 1, . . . , R since P 1 , . . . , P R are completely known. Now consider the deterministic newsvendor game for coalition N r with the complete knowledge of the joint distribution P r . There exists at least one imputation for this cooperative game; thus, we have i∈Nrv i ≤v(N r ), ∀ r = 1, . . . , R.
Using the fact that N = R r=1 N r and N r ∩ N s = ∅ for all r = s, we have
Thus, the existence condition is satisfied and the robust newsvendor game (N , Y, V(P(P 1 , . . . , P r )), n ) always has an imputation.
We focus on properties of core solutions of the robust newsvendor game (N , Y, V(P(P 1 , . . . , P r )), n )
next. (a) The ordering quantity y is the worst-case optimal ordering quantity, i.e., y = y * wc (N ).
is a core solution of the (deterministic) newsvendor game (N r ,v).
Proof. Let us consider a core solution (y, z) of the robust newsvendor game (N , Y, V(P(P 1 , . . . , P r )), n ).
For each coalition N r , r = 1, . . . , R, we have
This is due to the fact that P r is known with certainty and v wc (N r ) ≥ 0. According to Lemma 2 and Equality (25), for (y, z) to be a core solution, we need to have
Summing this over r = 1, . . . , R, we obtain
Given Assumption 1(ii), min
Hence, we can rewrite Inequality (27) as
This leads to
where the last equality comes from Lemma 4. Thus, all the inequalities in the chain need to be tight.
It implies that the ordering quantity y is the worst-case optimal ordering quantity, y = y * wc (N ) for (28) to be tight. We also obtain
for (26) to be tight. In addition, for all coalition S r ⊂ N r , by using the similar argument in deriving Equality (25), we have
which means v wc (N ) · z(N r ) is a core solution of the deterministic newsvendor game (N r ,v) for r = 1, . . . , R.
Theorem 4 shows that in order to check whether a particular decision (y, z) is a core solution of the robust newsvendor game (N , Y, V(P(P 1 , . . . , P r )), n ), we only need to consider y = y * wc (N ). The optimization problem (19) for checking the existence of core solutions can be reduced to the following linear program:
Unlike the deterministic newsvendor games, the robust newsvendor games do not always have core solution for N ≥ 3. The following example shows a simple robust newsvendor game with N = 3 whose core is empty. Example 1. Let us consider the partition of N = {1, 2, 3} with R = 2, N 1 = {1, 2} and N 3 = {3}.
The probability distribution P 1 of (d 1 ,d 2 ) is characterized by the uniform marginal distribution ofd 1 , According Theorem 4, if the robust newsvendor game (N , Y, V(P(P 1 , P 2 )), n ) has a core solution (y, z), then y = y * wc (N ). Given P 1 and P 2 , we are able to compute and bound some values of v max (y, S) where S ⊂ N , as follows:
For clarity of the exposition, we leave the detailed computation of these values in the Appendix. Now, since (y, z) is a core solution,
which is a contradiction or this robust newsvendor game does not have a core solution.
We now focus on how to solve Problem (29) to check the existence of core solutions of robust newsvendor games. If the core is empty, i.e., σ(y * wc (N )) > 0, least core solutions for the robust newsvendor game can be found by solving the general problem (19) , which will be discussed in the next section.
Core and Least Core Computation
Both Problems (19) and (29) v P (y, N ).) We have:
For newsvendor games, it is reasonable to assume that demands follow discrete non-negative distributions, which could be constructed from historical sales or market analysis. More specifically, let each distribution P r ofd r be represented as a discrete non-negative distribution with K r values, d k r of probability p k r , for k = 1, . . . , K r , r = 1, . . . , R. Thus, each probability distribution P in P(P 1 , . . . , P R ) is a discrete distribution with a support of K = R r=1
K r values d k and each has an unknown probability of q k , k = 1, . . . , K. For P to be consistent with P 1 , . . . , P R , the following constraints on q must hold:
Given the one-to-one mapping between P and q, we abuse the notations and write both v P (y, S) and v q (y, S) interchangeably when the context is clear for q to be the corresponding representation of P .
Problem (30) can be reformulated as
For each fixed γ, we can apply the standard method for transforming a linear fractional optimization problem into a linear program (see, for example, Cambini et al. [5] ). To this end, let us introduce new decision variables
Under Assumption 1(ii), we have θ > 0. The objective function then becomes
and Problem (32) can be reformulated as
where the first two constraints in (33) There exists an optimal solution (γ * , θ * , ψ * ) of Problem (33) such that
Proof.
Given an arbitrary value of γ, Problem (33) is reduced to a linear program for θ and ψ over a fixed feasible set F defined by the set of constraints in (33), i.e., γ only affects the objective function. Under Assumption 1(ii), θ and ψ are non-negative and bounded, which means F is bounded and Problem (33) can be written as follows:
where {(θ s , ψ s )} s=1,...,S is the set of extreme points of F. Equivalently, we have:
For an arbitrary solution (θ s , ψ s ), s = 1, . . . , S, it is easy to show that function f (γ; which belongs to the set {d 1 (S), . . . , d K (S)}. Thus we have:
, which shows that there exists an optimal solution (γ * , θ * , ψ * ) of Problem (33) such that
Proposition 1 shows us how to compute v max (y, S) by solving at most K linear programs. We can use this approach to compute v max (y * wc (N ), S) as inputs of the linear program (29) , which is then solved to check the existence of core solutions of the robust newsvendor game (N , Y, V(P(P 1 , . . . , P r )), n ).
If the core is empty, we need to consider the general problem (19) applying to the robust newsvendor game, whose optimal solutions can be considered as its least core solutions. Let us consider the following problem, which is similar to (29) , for an arbitrary y ∈ Y(N ):
Clearly, s(N , Y, V(P(P 1 , . . . , P r )), n ) = min y∈Y(N ) σ(y), which is a reformulation of the least core problem (19) . We will show that σ(y) is a convex function in the following proposition. In order to prove the proposition, we need the following lemma.
is a convex function of y on Y(N ) for all P ∈ P(P 1 , . . . , P R ).
Proof. Let q be the corresponding probability vector of a joint distribution P ∈ P(P 1 , . . . , P R ). We have: and y ∈ Y(N ). We then have:
which is the maximum of convex inverse linear functions on Y(N ) and hence is also a convex function in Y(N ).
We are now ready to prove the Proposition 2.
Proof. (a) If S ⊆ N r for some r, r = 1, . . . , R, we have: Y(S) = {y * (S)} and
where Q = Q(P 1 , . . . , P R ) is the feasible set of the probability vector q as described in (31). The second equality follows from the fact thatv(S) ≥ 0 and v P (y, N ) > 0. Since Q is a bounded polytope; there exists an optimal solution q * ∈ Q * , where Q * is the set of extreme points of Q. Thus we have:
.
is convex for each q according to Lemma 5, we have:
Now consider an arbitrary S N with Y(S) = R + . We have,
We have: v P (y, N ) > 0 for all P ∈ P(P 1 , . . . , P R ) and y ∈ Y(N ). In addition, Y(S) = R + , thus there always exists γ ∈ Y(S) small enough such that v P (γ, S) ≥ 0 for any P . We then have: v max (y, S) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ Y(N ). We can rewrite the formulation of v max (y, S) as follows:
Proposition 1 shows that we can restrict the domain of γ to the discrete set {d 1 (S), . . . , d K (S)}, that is,
For a fixed γ, the inner problem is a linear fractional optimization problem over the bounded polyhedron Q and hence there exists an optimal solution q * given that v P (y, N ) > 0 for all y ∈ Y(N ) and P ∈ P(P 1 , . . . , P R ). Let us consider the level sets L α of the linear fractional objective function, which are hyperplanes. For the optimal objective value α * , we have:
where Q * is the set of extreme points of Q. Since α * is the optimal objective value, Q belongs to a half-space defined by L α * . Suppose, on contradiction, that L α * ∩ Q * = ∅. Due to convexity and since the entire Q * belongs to the same half-space defined by L α * , we have:
With L α * ∩ Q * = ∅, we can now compute v max (y, S) as follows:
Since v max (y, S) ≥ 0, we can focus on the set H ∈ {d 1 (S),
Applying Lemma (5), clearly, v max (y, S) is the maximum of convex functions, which means it is also a convex function.
(b) To prove the convexity of σ(y), we show that, for any {y 1 , y 2 , y 3 } ∈ Y(N ) such that there exists
Let (x 1 , 1 ) and (x 3 , 3 ) be the optimal solutions of (34) when y = y 1 and y = y 3 , respectively. Let
. It is easy to verify that e T x 2 = 1. In addition, for all S N , we have
where (35) comes directly from the construction of (x 2 , 2 ); (36) comes from the feasibility of (x 1 , 1 )
and (x 3 , 3 ); (37) comes from the convexity of v max (y, S) as shown in part (a). Finally, (38) comes directly from the definition of y 2 .
This shows that (x 2 , 2 ) is a feasible solution of (34) when y = y 2 . Therefore,
i.e., σ(y) is a convex function.
Proposition 2 shows that the least core problem (19) for our robust newsvendor game is a convex optimization problem in terms of y and we could apply simple one-dimensional search algorithms to find the optimal solution. The next section provides some numerical results on the properties and computation of the core (and least core) solutions of robust newsvendor games.
Numerical Results
We consider the following experimental setting. We are given a set of retailers N and a partition N 1 , . . . , N R . In addition, for each r = 1, . . . , R, we are given the discrete historical joint demand distribution P r for the subset of retailers N r but not the joint demand distribution of all retailers.
Discussions in Section 4.2 allow us to compute a robust core (or least core) solution by solving (29) (and (19) if necessary) under the framework of robust newsvendor games, which consists of the allocation scheme z rob and an order quantity y rob for the grand coalition.
In order to evaluate the performance of the robust solution (y rob , z rob ), we are going to compare it with the solution derived from the deterministic newsvendor game under the assumption that all multivariate marginal distributions P r , r = 1, . . . , R, are independent of each other, that is,
r . This could be considered as a common assumption on the joint distribution given its marginal distributions. Clearly, the resulting joint distribution P I belongs to P(P 1 , . . . , P R ). Given this distribution P I , we can compute the allocation scheme
where x is a core solution of the deterministic newsvendor game with respect to P I . In addition, the optimal order quantity y det for the grand coalition in this deterministic newsvendor game is used to form the solution (y det , z det ), which will be compared with the robust solution (y rob , z rob ).
We shall compare the performance of these two solutions with respect to joint distributions which belong to P(P 1 , . . . , P R ). Given a distribution P ∈ P(P 1 , . . . , P R ), we compute the maximum normalized dissatisfaction or worst normalized excess value for each solution. For (y rob , z rob ), the excess value is computed as
The excess value P det can be defined in the same fashion for (y det , z det ). We follow the stress test approach proposed by Dupačová [11] with the contaminated distributions P λ = λP I + (1 − λ)P ext for λ ∈ [0, 1], where P ext are extremal distributions, i.e., those distributions which are likely to be the ones with which v max (y, S) are computed. Similar approach has been discussed in Bertsimas et al. [3] to test the quality of some stochastic optimization solutions.
We now consider a numerical example with n = 10 and R = 2, with the sizes of subsets, |N 1 | = 4 and |N 2 | = 6, respectively. We construct multivariate marginal distributions P 1 and P 2 from a randomly generated discrete joint distribution with the support set of each individual retailer's demand set to [1, 10] . Other parameters include p = 1.5 and c = 1. All the numerical results are tested on a PC with 2.67 gigahertz CPU, 12 gigabyte RAM, and a 64-bit Windows 7 operating system. We use MATLAB 8.0 for coding and IBM CPLEX Studio Academic version 12.5 for solving LPs problems under default settings. In order to compute a robust core (or least core) solution of this game, we would need to compute v max (y, S) for each of 2 n = 1024 coalitions. This is accomplished by solving a number of linear programs as presented in Proposition 1. On average, the total time it took to compute a single value v max (y, S) is approximately 12 seconds under this setting. Problem (29) can then be directly solved whereas (19) is solved with a simple one-dimensional search algorithm whose main subroutine depends on the solution of (29) for different values of y.
In this numerical example, for a given value of λ, we simply generate 100 random extremal distributions P ext by solving the linear program {max c T q : q ∈ Q} with random cost vectors c. We also include extremal distributions produced while calculating v max . The excess values P rob and P det are computed for all contaminated distributions P λ . Figure 1 provides comparisons on three statistics of P rob and P det for each fixed value of λ: the maximum, the minimum, and the average. The maximum values of both P rob and P det increase when λ increases. For λ > 0.5, the robust solution (y rob , z rob ) yields smaller excess values in the worst case as compared to those of (y det , z det ) for contaminated distributions. It shows that the robust solution hedges against the worst case as expected even though on average, the solution (y det , z det ) is slightly better in terms of worst excess values. It is worth noting that in the best case, both solutions are core solutions with no dissatisfaction even for the case of λ = 1.
We run the experiment again for M = 20 different instances. Figure 2 shows the statistics of P rob and P det when λ = 1 for all of these instances. The results again show that the robust solution (y rob , z rob ) consistently outperforms (y det , z det ) for all these instances in the worst case and is slightly worse on average. Finally, we run the experiment again for four different settings with respect to sizes of the two subsets, (1, 9) , (2, 8) , (3, 7) , and (5, 5) , in addition to the original setting of (4, 6) , with M = 20 instances for each setting. Figure 3 shows the box plots for the maximum values of P rob and P det when λ = 1. The results again show that the robust solution (y rob , z rob ) outperforms (y det , z det ) in the worst case. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a framework for newsvendor games with ambiguity in demand distributions, which we call robust cooperative games. We discuss solution concepts of robust cooperative games and study them in the context of newsvendor games with ambiguity in demand distributions when only marginal distributions are known. Some numerical results are provided, which show the robust core solutions hedge against the worst cases as expected. It is possible to develop other frameworks for cooperative games with uncertain characteristic functions by using different payoff distribution schemes and preference relations, which could be applied to other applications.
Appendix: Derivation for Example 1
Let us consider the robust newsvendor game introduced in Example 1. According to Lemma 4, the worst-case optimal ordering quantity y * wc (N ) is computed as follows: Given P ∈ P(P 1 , P 2 ), we have: Now consider the sub-coalition {1, 3}. Let P be the distribution characterized by the marginal distribution ofd 1 and the relationshipd 2 =d 3 = D −d 1 . Clearly, P ∈ P(P 1 , P 2 ). In addition, let y = D, which is a feasible ordering quantity, we have: Given the symmetry betweend 1 andd 2 , we can show that v max (y * wc (N ), {2, 3}) = v max (y * wc (N ), {1, 3}). Thus, we obtain the required inequalities, 
